Tenet Reaped Outsize Gains
From Flaw in Medicare System
By RHONDA L. RUNDLE and ANNA WILDE MATHEWS
Staff Reporters of THE
The
disclosure of pumped-up Medicare revenue at Tenet Healthcare Corp., the nation's second-largest publicly traded
hospital company, has exposed a flaw in the Medicare
system: By raising rates sharply, Tenet hospitals triggered an obscure mechanism
that automatically boosted their payments.
At
issue is Tenet's outsize revenue from supplemental fees for the most expensive
patients, called "outliers" in Medicare terminology. Those fees,
according to Medicare data, are making up nearly a quarter of the company's
projected revenue this fiscal year from the federal medical-insurance system
for senior citizens -- and brought in $412 million more in 2002 than just two
years earlier. Medicare's top administrator said in an interview this weekend that
the mechanism "invited gaming" and has to be changed.
Tenet is in mounting crisis amid a federal audit into the
payments. At the same time, two heart doctors that work in a Tenet hospital --
two of the top Medicare billers in their specialties
in
Chief
Executive Jeffrey C. Barbakow last week responded by
cleaning house, bringing in a new second in command and crowding out chief
operating officer Thomas B. Mackey, who developed the company's aggressive
pricing strategy, and chief financial officer David L. Dennis, Mr. Barbakow's longtime friend.
FULL
COVERAGE
Listen to
a Tenet conference call
<http://web.servicebureau.net/conf/meta?i=1112343233&c=2343&m=was&u=/w_ccbn.xsl&date_ticker=11_7_2002_THC>
1 on Medicare payments.
For more
health coverage, visit the Online Journal's Health Industry Edition at wsj.com/health
<http://wsj.com/health> 2 and receive daily health e-mails
<http://online.wsj.com/user-cgi-bin/searchUser.pl?action=emailalert> 3.
The
company is not accused of any wrongdoing. Tenet officials say they didn't
encourage doctors to perform expensive operations, or change the company's
pricing structure to deliberately gouge Medicare. They say the increased
payments were a side effect of the company's growing size and clout in
Tom
Scully, administrator of the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services in
But
auditors will look at whether Tenet went too far. Among the nation's big
hospital chains, Tenet gets by far the highest percentage of its Medicare
income from supplemental payments for the most expensive patients, called
"outliers." HCA-The Healthcare
Co., the largest hospital company, is projected to get only 5% of its
Medicare revenue from outlier payments in fiscal 2003, compared with 23.5% for
Tenet, according to Medicare data.
Tenet's
aggressive strategy helped transform the company into a Wall Street darling in
the last three years, as it posted a string of stellar earnings reports. Its
stock price soared, allowing executives at the Santa Barbara-based firm to reap
tens of millions of dollars selling shares and exercising options. It
represented an impressive turnaround for Mr. Barbakow,
who was brought in to clean up Tenet nine years ago after its predecessor
company, National Medical Enterprises Inc., was nearly destroyed by criminal
fraud charges against its psychiatric hospitals, which it later sold.
One
of those profiting from the soaring stock was Mr. Mackey, the chief operating
officer. On Oct. 4, Mr. Mackey sold 277,500 shares of Tenet stock at $51.50 a
share, garnering $14.3 million. That was a day after a 52-week high and a few
weeks before an Oct. 28 analyst's report about Tenet's reliance on outlier
payments sent the stock falling. The company says Mr. Mackey exercised option
grants. Mr. Mackey didn't respond to several messages left for him.
Mr. Barbakow sparred with investors in a conference call last
week that stretched nearly three hours.He said in an
interview this weekend that he hasn't "found any evidence as of this
point" that Tenet was doing anything wrong. But he says the pricing
strategy's effect on Medicare payments "puts the company in a position I
don't feel comfortable with."
The
market's reaction to the events has been swift and severe. Instead of
reassuring investors, Mr. Barbakow's actions -- and
statements that he wasn't aware of the details of the pricing strategy -- have
made them worried that Tenet's situation could turnworse.
U.S. Rep. Pete Stark, a California Democrat, compares Tenet's actions with
those of HCA, which two years ago paid a record $840 million in criminal fines,
civil penalties and damages to end a government probe of its Medicare billing
practices.
The
company's defenders argue that the Medicare system itself is largely to blame
for a reimbursement formula that resulted in outsize payments to Tenet.
Health-industry executives frequently criticize the system for being so
convoluted and full of gray areas that it invites abuse. The Medicare handbook
for hospitals and physicians is more than 100,000 pages long and
"represents more than 35 years of regulations, changes, adjustments and
readjustments," said Ken Weakley, an analyst at UBS Warburg., author of
the Oct. 28 report on Tenet's outlier payments.
A
question for auditors is whether the enlarged payments to Tenet hospitals were
proper or whether the company deliberately set up its pricing structure to
manipulate the reimbursement system for greater gains.
The
trail begins in 1999, after Tenet consolidated two big acquisitions that
brought it a slew of new hospitals in
Mr.
Mackey, who had overseen the Western region, took over the nuts and bolts of
Tenet's hospital operations nationwide. Mr. Mackey, a National Medical veteran
who had joined the company in 1985, faced a grim situation. A cutback in
hospital Medicare payments had flattened Tenet's revenue growth, depressed its
stock and forced a wrenching 30% cut in corporate overhead spending.
Mr.
Mackey developed a policy to raise so-called chargemaster
prices, a kind of health-care equivalent of the sticker price at car lots.
Insurers and the government don't actually pay chargemaster
rates. But they are used in complex pricing formulas that determine how much
Medicare pays in supplemental fees for outliers, expensive cases that exceed
normal fixed rates.
As
Tenet raised its prices aggressively, the ratio used to calculate Medicare
payments for such cases was thrown badly out of whack. It triggered a
decades-old mechanism that substitutes a ratio of statewide average costs and
charges. The mechanism was designed to determine payments when data from
individual hospitals appeared wildly inaccurate.It
boosted the payments to Tenet. In essence, Tenet reaped rewards by triggering a
hidden jackpot in the Medicare system. None of HCA's hospitals are receiving
any payments from the substitute ratio, Mr. Weakley reported.
Tenet's
price increases became more aggressive in 2000 after Mr. Dennis, a veteran
investment banker, became Tenet's chief financial officer. He stepped up
pressure to keep Tenet's revenue growing swiftly and instituted high
performance targets at the corporate level, people close to the situation say.
That set up a race between Mr. Mackey and Mr. Dennis to achieve ever-better
financial results, those people say. They add that tensions developed inside
Tenet's headquarters as some managers started to feel uncomfortable with the
hard-charging style of Mr. Barbakow's two top
lieutenants. Mr. Barbakow says, "I'm not arguing
with that, but I didn't see that." Mr. Dennis did not return calls for
comment.
The
impact of the stepped-up outlier payments on Tenet was enormous. Those payments
increased to $763 million in fiscal 2002, up from $351 million two years
earlier. Almost two-thirds of the 2002 number -- $481 million -- came from
Tenet hospitals that benefited from the statewide average multiplier. That also
represented 46 cents of the company's $2.17 per share earnings from operations.
Tenet believes that in the current fiscal year, it will collect even more, $515
million, from these statewide average payments. That would be 50 cents of the
company's projected per-share earnings for 2003 of $2.93, based on a 25%
increase in adjusted earnings from 2002.
Mr. Barbakow says that he had never focused on the financial
impact of the outlier payments until sometime in the week of Oct. 14 when Mr.
Weakley, the UBS Warburg analyst, called to ask questions of a Tenet investor-relations
executive, who in turn talked to Mr. Barbakow.
Two
days after Mr. Weakley's report hit the market, FBI
agents raided
It
is unclear what connection, if any, there could be between the increased
outlier payments and the FBI's interest in the two doctors. One question it
could raise is whether Tenet hospital administrators may have pressured doctors
in ways that encouraged them to do unnecessary high-priced operations and
procedures. "Flatly no," Mr. Barbakow says.
"That hasn't been our strategy."
Neither
the two doctors nor Tenet was charged with any crime, but investors were
spooked. Tenet has been stressing to investors its success in attracting
patients to its cardiology, neurology and orthopedic departments, which are
among the highest billers in any hospital. Kevin Wenck, president of Polynous
Capital Management Inc., an investment firm in
According
to the affidavit, Dr. Realyvasquez and Dr. Moon were
the Nos. 1 and 2 billers to the Medicare program in
their respective medical specialities in the
Dr.
Moon, the head of
Last
week, Mr. Barbakow separately confronted Mr. Dennis,
53, and Mr. Mackey, 54 , telling them he had lost
confidence in them. "I expect people to flag the headaches and things I
should be getting involved in. I guess I didn't hammer away enough on these
individuals," he said. Last Thursday, Tenet announced Mr. Mackey's
retirement and said Mr. Dennis had voluntarily left the company. Mr. Barbakow brought back Trevor Fetter, 42, a trusted lieutenant
who had moved over to a Tenet hospital services affiliate in 2000, and named
him president.
The
reshuffle, which was accompanied by a more full disclosure by Tenet of the role
outlier payments played in its performance, backfired. Tenet shares again fell,
leaving its stock price last Friday at $14.90, down from a high of $52.50 on
Oct. 3. Mr. Barbakow "obviously fumbled the ball
to some degree by not asking the right questions," said David Woodyatt, a buy-side investment analyst at Harris Bank, a unit
of Bank of Montreal. "You get into a situation where either
he knew and didn't tell us, so you can't trust him, or he didn't know
something he should have known."
Write to Rhonda L. Rundle at
rhonda.rundle@wsj.com4 and Anna Wilde Mathews at anna.mathews@wsj.com5
Updated
Copyright 2002 Dow Jones & Company, Inc. All
Rights Reserved
Printing, distribution, and use of this material
is governed by your Subscription agreement and
Copyright laws.
For information about subscribing go to
http://www.wsj.com